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Abstract 
To what extent does dance contribute to an ideal of beauty that can enrich human quality 
of life? To what extent are standards of beauty predicated on an ideal human body that has no 
disability? In this chapter, we show how conceptions of proportionality, perfection, and 
ethereality from the Ancient Greeks through the 19th century can still be seen today in some 
kinds of dance, particularly in ballet. Disability studies and disability-inclusive dance companies, 
however, have started to change this. The disabled person can be beautiful, we will show, in 
dance and in life, under a disability aesthetics that follows Edmund Burke (1730-1797) and that 
suggests an alternative standard of beauty, which we call “beauty-in-experience,” where beauty 
is perceived in the qualitative experience of abled and disabled dancers moving together in dance.  
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Introduction: Beauty Reconsidered 
 Arthur C. Danto notes in his book, The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of 
Art (2003), that one of the great advances in the philosophy of art has been to understand that not 
all good art is beautiful. He cites Henri Matisse’s painting Blue Nude (1907) as a case in point (p. 
36).  He also says, however, that: 
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… beauty is the only one of the aesthetic qualities that is also a value, like truth and 
goodness. It is not simply among the values we live by, but one of the values that defines 
what a fully human life means. (p. 15) 
In On Beauty and Being Just, Elaine Scarry (1999) also points to Matisse’s paintings as 
examples that expand the capacity of our minds to change and accommodate new forms of 
beauty (pp. 46-47). Scarry also credits Matisse for showing us how beautiful persons or things 
lead the perceiver “to a more capacious regard for the world” (p. 48). Like Danto and Scarry, 
rather than claiming that beauty is an outmoded idea, we hold to the need for this important 
concept. 
This chapter is an attempt to reconsider the idea of beauty in a way that broadens it to 
include the possibility that there can be beauty in disability when the perceiver learns to expand 
their regard for the world through dance-based and other social interactions with disabled 
persons. This broadening is not a watering-down of the idea of beauty, but rather an enriching of 
it in a way that is true to what is happening in both dance and in non-dance life. In reconsidering 
beauty, we will first look to the historical origins of the dominant contemporary understanding of 
beauty. From there we will show how historical accounts of beauty can be traced through 
developments in dance history in connection with finding beauty in the dancing human body. 
Finally, we will show how experiencing beauty through contemporary dance expands both the 
idea of beauty and the quality of life by leading us to greater mutuality with others who exist 
with us in the world (see Albrecht and Devlieger, 1999).  In short, disabled dance allows us 
greater access, via experience and interactive communication with others who are different from 
us, to both beauty and an expanded quality of life. 
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In the history of aesthetics, ugliness and bodily deformity were linked. Eighteenth-
century philosophers and thinkers such as the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and 
David Hume suggested that bodily deformity could not be beautiful.  In contrast to these thinkers, 
Edmund Burke (1730-1797) provides a model in which perfection or proportion were not 
necessary for beauty. In this chapter, we propose a perspective on beauty-in-experience rather 
than a classical or neo-classical conception of beauty in which perfection or proportion are 
necessary. Our view of beauty builds from a Burkean perceptual model rather than a Kantian 
judgment model.  
When a human being encounters another human, an animal or plant, a work of art, or a 
natural scene, a certain feeling is conveyed between the object and the perceiver. What is at work 
behind such perception? What does the body have to do with such experiences? A present-day 
philosopher, Roger Scruton (2009) sets up this problem under the term “judgment” (after Kant), 
suggesting that what matters is a judgment of taste “for which the technical term ‘aesthetic’ is 
now in common use” (p. 17). Unlike Scruton, the Burkean perceptual model might describe 
beauty in biological or evolutionary terms avant la lettre, where a certain experience of bodily 
features like webs, wings, breasts, hips or muscular tone create a perception of beauty. As we 
will see, this perceptual model is not clearly tied to a judgment or rational claim about the object 
being perceived. 
Classical Beauty 
 The classical ideal for beauty appears in both its Ancient Greek and European 
(Renaissance through 19th century) versions. In short, this idea held that the standard for beauty 
is one of harmony, symmetry, and proportion, and that this form of beauty imitates or is found in 
the perfection of the gods or of the universe. This latter line of reasoning (usually associated with 
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German philosophy of the 18th century) regards perfection as the basis of beauty. Following 
Leibniz, Moses Mendelssohn defined beauty as an intellectual (and thus rational) perfection of 
an object (see Hochman, 2014, p. 39f.; Bourke, 2015, p. 133ff.). Although written in a literary 
form, Mendelssohn’s (1761) Letters on Sentiments is an important discussion of this issue at the 
very origin of aesthetics as a discipline (Mendelssohn, 1997). The principal contrast in this text is 
between sensual perfection and rational perfection. Two of the characters of this dialogue stand 
for each of these ways of interpreting beauty: Euphranor supports a sensual (English) perception 
of beauty and Theocles the intellectual (German) perception. 
Ancient Greek Beauty 
 Proportionality, a classical ideal, concerns ratios, numbers, and a beautiful form. Basing 
beauty on proportionality tends to exclude any element of feeling or property of the mind. From 
Plato to Shaftesbury, beauty primarily concerns the property of an object that is symmetrical and 
orderly—with proper mathematical ratios. For the Greeks, beauty is not an autonomous field of 
inquiry nor is it primarily applied to art. Instead, for Plato, beauty concerns eros, the desire for 
something lacking in oneself (Hyland, 2008; Kraut, 2008). The important point for Plato (and 
Neoplatonism) is how auto to kalon, “beauty itself,” is a perfect and eternal form unchangeable 
and divorced from bodies. Eros is meant to lead us to this perfect form. We can begin to see how 
much this conception of beauty has changed since the Renaissance.  
Ancient Greek Beauty and the Origin of Ballet. Owen Smith (2005) points out that the 
classical standard for Western theatre dance has long been the Apollonian model of corporeal 
harmony, proportion and verticality. Indeed, Jennifer Homans’ (2010) book on the history of 
ballet is titled Apollo’s Angels. There Homans points out that Gaetan Vestris was known as “the 
god of the dance” for having a body that approximated the Apollonian ideal, with a “long, lean, 
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elegantly apportioned body with physical stature and beauty” (pp. 26-27). Ballet is one of the 
main vehicles for the classical ideal of the body (Novack, 1993). 
 Ballet’s aesthetic values derived from Ancient Greece show a Platonic as well as an 
Apollonian ideal for beauty. When Catherine De Medici married Henri II she brought ballet to 
France from Florence, after which it was developed by the French monarchies in order to 
combine their Christian beliefs, which included a body-transcendent love of God, with the ideal, 
Platonic world of the forms (Homans, 2010, pp. 3-6). Their Neoplatonic idea was to reveal God 
and His secret, ideal realm by shifting their attention away from passions and physical desire and 
towards the beauty of number, proportion, and design (p. 6).  
Classical ballet has had a profound influence on the development of Western theatre 
dance overall, including its idea of beauty. Petra Kuppers (2000) observes that ballet is often 
cited by dance biographers as the form of dance that initially attracted their imagination and that 
this has an effect on their idea of the “dancerly body” as one that is “perfect” or “ideal” in a 
classical way (pp. 122-123).  
Neo-Classical Beauty 
 In Western culture and in the ballet that became part of that culture, the idea of beauty 
progressed and developed from a classical to a neo-classical standard over time, one that 
changed the idea of beauty in classical proportionality to one that included fitness for function. 
Anticipating evolutionary theory of the 19th century, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713) 
speaks of a spider and a fly in the following way: “The heedless flight, weak frame and tender 
body of this [fly] fits and determines him as much a prey as the rough make, watchfulness and 
cunning of the [spider] fits him for rapine and the ensnaring part” (Shaftesbury, 1997, pp. 18-19). 
The important point for Shaftesbury is that there is a structural analogy between species, but also 
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between limbs and organs. “And in the structure of each of these animals,” he notes, “there is as 
apparent and perfect a relation to the other as, in our own bodies, there is a relation of limbs and 
organs or as, in the branches or leaves of a tree, we see a relation to each other and all, in 
common, to one root and trunk” (p. 168). In neo-classical beauty, the function of the organ or 
body as it relates to the whole becomes part of the thinking at the origin of aesthetics in a manner 
that, at the time, had not previously been emphasized. 
 Neo-Classical Beauty in Aristocratic Europe and Ballet.  The purpose of classical 
ballet, as taught in the French Académie Royale de Musique et de Danse, established by Louis 
XIV in 1661, was to teach noblemen the bearing, carriage, posture, and grace that befitted the 
aristocratic class in Western Europe (Homans, 2010; Smith, 2005). This was part of a trend 
across Europe during Shaftesbury’s time in which aesthetics as a discipline was born (Klein, 
2004; Vermeir & Deckard, 2012). Classical ballet sought to teach this comportment not only as 
an aesthetic property to be experienced as pleasing or beautiful, but to include the moral quality 
of how one should conduct oneself in society. Thus beauty in ballet, from its inception, included 
both the aesthetic property of beauty and the idea of beauty as a human ethical value. The 
standard for the posture and type of body that was best for ballet can be seen in Leonardo da 
Vinci’s geometrical drawing of The Vitruvian Man (1490) man (see photo insert below), where 
the ideal body was taken to reflect universal laws of nature, proportion and harmony (Homans, 
2010, p. 134). 
[*Insert Leonardo da Vinci The Vitruvian Man photo] 
Nineteenth-century Romanticism gave rise to the ballerina as female and sylph, with 
Marie Taglioni being admired both for encapsulating this ethereal ideal as well as for her 
“bourgeois propriety” (see Homans photo inserts following 134). Indeed, the development of 
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pointe shoes increased both the line of the ballerina’s leg and elevated her towards the heavens. 
Homans notes that Taglioni’s foot on pointe was even an object of romantic fantasy (p. 141). It is 
this balletic aesthetic of beautiful ethereality, what Petra Kuppers (2000) calls “the form’s 
insistence on lightness and immateriality,” that creates the “hypervisibility” of the disabled body, 
since what does not fit with this ideal is thrown into high relief (p. 124). Kuppers’ theory of 
disability will be discussed further towards the end of this chapter. 
Beauty in Balanchine Ballet  
 George Balanchine was a direct inheritor of ballet as an aristocratic art form. Born in St. 
Petersburg in 1904 he learned ballet at the Imperial Ballet Theatre under the reign of Tsar 
Nicholas II, where he both boarded and was taught his academic subjects. He also trained as a 
musician at the St. Petersburg Conservatory. During the Communist revolution, the Imperial 
Ballet fell into disrepair and the students were often hungry and cold. Balanchine fled to Paris, 
where he spent a number of years dancing and choreographing ballets for various dance troupes. 
Lincoln Kirstein discovered Balanchine at Diaghilev’s Ballet Russes and brought him to America 
in 1933. Together they founded the New York City Ballet (NYCB) (Volkov, 1985, pp. 111-112). 
The NYCB arguably reached its heyday in the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, before Balanchine’s death, 
a period of time following the emergence of the avant-garde movement that made beauty 
unnecessary for philosophy’s concept of art (Danto, 2003). Philosophers and critics who declared 
a beauty crisis in art could not have been those in the audience who were in the thrall of a 
Balanchine ballet (pp. 14, 26).  
The beauty of Balanchine ballet is classical in many aspects even though Balanchine 
called his style “neo-classical ballet” to distinguish it from older classical styles like Enrico 
Cecchetti’s.  His ballets contain order, unexpectedness, inevitability, economy (Euclid and 
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Pythagoras according to Osborne, 1984, p. 295), and “coherent harmoniousness” with music 
under a unifying Idea (Plotinus: 34-36). This classicism is particularly in evidence in the ballets 
he created with Igor Stravinsky, a composer who acknowledged “a profound admiration for 
classical ballet, which in its very essence, by the beauty of its ordonnance [arrangement of 
elements] and the aristocratic austerity of its forms … represents the triumph of the studied 
conception over vagueness, of the rule over the arbitrary, of order over the haphazard” 
(Stravinsky: 99-100). Stravinsky noted that for Apollo Balanchine designed “groups, movements, 
and lines of great dignity and plastic elegance as inspired by the beauty of classical forms” (143). 
Indeed, in classical philosophers like Plotinus (1964) we find “the beauty [that] craftsmanship 
confers upon a house … and all its parts” (p. 36). Balanchine ballet might also be said to 
commune “with the intelligible realm” by its ability to be appreciated with the “faculty that is 
peculiarly sensitive to this beauty” and then judged in accordance with that faculty’s “own inner 
Idea, which it uses as a canon of accuracy” (p. 36.). 
[*Insert NYCB Apollo photo]  
Towards Beauty-in-Experience 
 In this section we discuss the philosophical background to our reconsidered standard of 
beauty—one that treats what we will here call “beauty-in-experience” as a development of, 
rather than departure from, conceptions of beauty that are found in Western philosophical 
aesthetics. We show how Edmund Burke’s 18th-century philosophy, for example, can provide a 
connecting link between traditional, perfection- and fitness-based standards of beauty and the 
contemporary idea of beauty-in-experience that is being developed by disability studies and 
disability-integrated dance companies. 
A Burkean Theory 
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 Edmund Burke (1730-1797) questioned many of his culture’s deeply held beliefs about 
beauty—in particular its having to be perfect or proportionate. Interpreters have not taken his 
view of beauty seriously, though, because of his gendered categories, and some of this hesitation 
may be justified. However, this chapter aims to defend a Burke-inspired experiential account of 
the origin of our ideas of the beautiful. Fundamentally, at the level of efficient cause, beauty 
refers to a corporeal relaxation rather than a tension (as in the sublime). 
While the English and the Scots upheld a theory of beauty based in proportionality and 
fitness, and the Germans one of intellectual perfection, the French constructed theories of beauty 
on more subjective matters, such as that of taste (goût) (Vermeir & Deckard, 2012). Burke is best 
read within a culture (as an Irishman in Great Britain) in which nerves and sensibilities as well as 
mores and manners become part of the philosophical vocabulary. Whereas the 17th century 
focused on the rationality of passion, the 18th century, and Burke in particular, speak in terms of 
bodily sensibility and experience. Following John Locke, who was a medical doctor, but also 
Richard Brocklesby’s (1722–1797) experiments on animals, Sarafianos (2005) explains that,  
[Brocklesby’s] research produced a new anatomical map … skin, nerves, and innervated 
parts were sensitive but motionless, while muscle fibers and membranes were insensible 
but moving .… Th[e] integrated perception of sensibility as a universal and omnipotent 
phenomenon of the body provides an immediate connection between Burke’s Enquiry 
and later manifestations of vitalist thinking. (p. 63)  
Burke’s experiential theory of beauty is described here in anatomical, psychological and neuro-
physiological terms, and as Sarafianos notes, this is a new way of describing the body. This 
medical background provides useful distinctions for our analysis. In looking specifically to dance, 
something Burke does not write about, we apply his theory of tensed nerves and relaxed solids—
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simply speaking, whether the body of the viewer is experienced as tense or relaxed—in a way 
that has not been done before.  
In part I, section X, of Philosophical Enquiry, “Of Beauty,” animals are treated as 
incapable of the sense for beauty as they are interested in sex only as a means of reproduction. 
“But man,” Burke (2015/1757) writes, “who is a creature adapted to a greater variety and 
intricacy of relation, connects with the general passion, the idea of some social qualities, which 
direct and heighten the appetite which he has in common with all other animals” (p. 67). This 
social quality applies to both genders equally and is the very basis of beauty in human nature. “I 
call beauty a social quality; for where women and men, and not only they, but when other 
animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them, (and there are many that do so) 
they inspire us with sentiments of tenderness and affection towards their persons” (p. 67).  
The most significant criticism of Burke concerns his theory in which beauty is feminine 
and the sublime is masculine—this is viewed as too gendered (O’Neill, 2007). Here is the crucial 
and controversial passage: 
This quality [of beauty], where it is highest in the female sex, almost always carries with 
it an idea of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this, for which 
reason, they learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit weakness, and even 
sickness. In all this, they are guided by nature. Beauty in distress is much the most 
affecting beauty. (p. 88) 
This passage needs to be taken in its socio-historical context. Burke’s is not a normative claim 
regarding how women should act, but rather it is describing an empirical example to support the 
claim that, “the appearance of beauty effectually causes some degree of love in us, as the 
application of ice or fire produces the ideas of heat or cold” (p. 74). While Burke would have 
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agreed with Shaftesbury’s (1997/1711) claim that “it is not merely what we call principle but a 
taste which governs men,” he contrasts Shaftesbury’s neo-classical (and aristocratic) claim that 
“if in the way of polite pleasure the study and love of beauty be essential, the study and love of 
symmetry and order, on which beauty depends, must also be essential in the same respect” (p. 
414). The perception of weakness is thus tied to beauty, which in the 18th century was connected 
to feminine mores. 
It is thus in the context of mixed sentiments (Burke, 2015/1757, Ch. III) combined with 
the rise of the aesthetic in Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Shaftesbury, among 
others, that a culture of taste and manners contributed to a deepening in the contrast between 
beauty and ugliness, or fitness and deformity (Hochman, 2014; Bourke, 2015, ch. 3). To situate 
Burke within this 18th-century context is to make a claim about beauty and disability that 
recovers beauty as a perceptual quality in place of a rational conceptual relation. What is it in this 
time of the rise of aesthetics that shifts the language from reason to feelings such that “abnormal” 
bodies may now be perceived anew? Later in the 19th century, romantic notions of beauty take 
over and, as Danto (2003) and Scarry (1999) have pointed out, by the time of the 20th century, 
the ideals of the beautiful had all but died out. Philosophical definitions had eclipsed the Platonic 
origins of eros and love, and as Deckard (2011) has shown, Burke is interpreting Plato’s love 
(and beauty) in terms of philia rather than eros. But in reconsidering beauty, the Burkean lens is 
a fruitful one through which to view contemporary dance, a form of dance developed from 
modern dance that offers dancers and audiences the opportunity to feel beauty by experiencing 
the ways that non-idealized bodies can move in ways that are afforded to them.  
Burkean Application 
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 The fundamental question underlying a rejection of the neo-classical in favor of a beauty-
in-experience perspective is the following: What is it that makes a body attractive in perceiving 
it? While there are other possible angles, let us take two possibilities here: size and shape, and 
movement. Since the background of Burke’s theory in particular is partly medical, with respect 
to nerves and the efficient cause already mentioned, we will attempt this application before 
turning to dance.  
What might the difference in size and shape of human bodies say about our perceptions 
of beauty? Here is one passage from Burke (2015/1757): “The neck, they say, in beautiful bodies 
should measure half the calf of the leg; it should likewise be twice the circumference of the wrist” 
(p. 78). According to Burke, as much as proportion and perfection had to be true of attractive 
bodies, it can just as likely be true of ugly bodies. He continues, 
You may assign any proportions you please to every part of the human body; and I 
undertake, that a painter shall religiously observe them all, and notwithstanding produce 
if he pleases, a very ugly figure. The same painter shall considerably deviate from these 
proportions, and produce a very beautiful one. (p. 78) 
He says the same of sculpture before turning to the male and female body: 
Consider how much difference there is between the measures that prevail in many similar 
parts of the body, in the two sexes of this single species only. If you assign any 
determinate proportions to the limbs of a man, and if you limit human beauty to these 
proportions, when you find a woman who differs in the make and measures of almost 
every part, you must conclude her not to be beautiful in spite of the suggestions of your 
imagination; or in obedience to your imagination you must renounce your rules; you must 
lay by the scale and compass, and look out for some other cause of beauty. For if beauty 
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be attached to certain measures which operate from a principle in nature, why should 
similar parts with different measures of proportion be found to have beauty, and this too 
in the very same species? But to open our view a little, it is worth observing, that almost 
all animals have parts of very much the same nature, and destined nearly to the same 
purposes; an head, neck, body, feet, eyes, ears, nose and mouth; yet Providence...has 
worked out of these few and similar organs, and members, a diversity hardly short of 
infinite in their disposition, measures, and relation. (p. 79)  
This long passage is quite remarkable, since Burke is critiquing a long tradition of proportion 
when it comes to size and shape, predicting an evolutionary standard—the animal kingdom 
(including humans) have different shapes and sizes and even some of the same “features” as 
humans.  
Again, what makes a body disproportionate? Are there dancers’ bodies that are attractive, 
but not proportionate according to a classical ideal? According to Burke, it is not a mathematical 
proportion or rational perfection that makes one attractive. Some may have perfect 
proportionality and not be attractive and some may have imperfect proportions and be very 
attractive. Thus, the size and shape of a body may have to do with beauty according to a 
“principle in nature,” but it is not pure mathematical relations that evoke the feeling of beauty.  
Furthermore, this is not a static standard, but rather can be adapted by different perceivers, of 
both classical and contemporary dance, including dance that includes disabled dancers. We turn 
now to a discussion of how disability studies suggest that we can learn to perceive differently 
through alteration of experience. 
The Contribution of Disability Studies 
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Disability studies go further than does Burke in suggesting that beauty is more than the 
perception of an ideally proportioned object or body, thereby adding a great deal to how we 
might claim beauty as something that can appear in disability, in both dance and in non-dance 
life. In the sections below we discuss the ways that disability studies, and the incorporation of 
some of its tenets (such as the social concept of disability to be discussed below) by the 
danceworld, has contributed to this broader concept of beauty. 
The Social vs. Medical Model of Disability  
 We will use Petra Kuppers’ view of the social model of disability to frame the discussion 
in the rest of this chapter. Kuppers (2003, 2011, 2014) explains that disability is a discursive 
construct that lies within the interaction between the person with atypical biology and the social 
environment, where a person is only labeled “disabled” when they cannot function adequately 
within dominant social structures and norms (see also Herman & Chatfield, 2010). If a public 
building is only accessible via a flight of stairs with no ramp, for example, a person who needs to 
use a wheelchair for access to the building will then encounter an obstacle that will signal their 
“disability”. This locates disability in the social landscape rather than in the differently-abled 
person. In a world with sufficient ramps, for example, the person using a wheelchair is not 
disabled; there is just a diversity of persons who can function in society, those who use legs and 
those who use wheels. 
The contrasting model is “the medical model of disability,” where the medical world sets 
the standard for “normal” biology. “Normal” might be a person with two legs, two arms, vision 
and hearing ability who can achieve certain tasks, etc., the standard for vision being 20-20. This 
model would locate any departure from this norm in the biology of the person who does not meet 
it (Kuppers, 2000, 2014; Herman & Chatfield, 2010). Kuppers (2014) credits this medical model 
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of disability with either creating or being part of the discriminatory social phenomenon known as 
“ableism”, in which the disabled person is characterized as inferior or in need of change (pp. 23-
24; Zitomer & Reid, 2011). Shelley Tremain (2015) links Foucault’s idea of biopower or 
biopolitics to disability studies. Understanding the dichotomy of “abled” and “disabled” as a 
function of normative regimes and values, which we have claimed might follow historically from 
a Burkean concept of beauty, paves the way for disability-inclusive dance to be beautiful in a 
way that increases the quality of life for those who experience this dance through bringing us 
into greater connection with and understanding of the movement qualities of differently-abled 
human beings.  
Disability-Inclusive Dance’s Contribution 
 As shown above, classical and neo-classical ideals of beauty are still alive in ballet 
companies like the NYCB. The disability-inclusive dance on which this chapter will now focus 
has developed out of the contemporary dance tradition. Contemporary dance in the 1960s and 
‘70s, like its precursor, modern dance, sought to counter the European, aristocratic ballet 
tradition by experimenting with new movement styles that explicitly connected with emerging 
social ideas and widened the idea of how a beautiful dance body should look (Novack, 1990). 
(Remember here that Burke allowed social ideas to affect our experience of beauty.) Dancers no 
longer had to be princes and princesses with elongated bodies made longer by thinness and 
pointe shoes. Dancers could now have bodies with strength and weight, and they could perform 
guttural and grounded movements in bare feet. Modern and contemporary dance companies 
opened the door to disability-inclusive companies by allowing dance to establish its own codes 
for movement, and for who could perform that movement, that were no longer tied to aristocratic 
norms (Anderson, 2008).  
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In recent years many forms of dance, including ballet, have tried to expand their 
audiences and respond to social pressures for inclusiveness by incorporating disabled dancers. 
The number of international dance companies and organizations that feature either all disabled 
dancers or are integrated or disability inclusive include (in alphabetical order and in addition to 
the ones we will describe more fully below) Ability Unlimited (India), Adugna Potentials 
(Ethiopia), AMICI (U.K.), Blue Eyed Soul (U.K.), Cleveland Ballet Dancing Wheels (U.S.), 
Dance Integrated (Australia), Danza Sin Limites, (Argentina), Disabled People’s Performing Art 
Troupe (China), Diverse Dance (Canada), Genesis of Entertainment (Japan), Grupo Alma 
(Argentina), Grupo Pulsar (Brazil), HandiCapace Tanz Kompanie (Germany), Infinite Flow 
(U.S.), Infinity Dance Theatre (U.S.), Le Ballets C. de la B (Belgium), Light Motion (U.S.), 
Mobility Junction (U.S.), MoMo Dance Theatre (Canada), Motion House (U.K.), Núcleo Dança 
Aberta (Brazil), Oiseau Mouche (France), Paradox Dance (U.S.), Remix Dance Project (South 
Africa), Stop Gap (U.K.), The Dance Laboratory (Norway), Tokounou Dance Company (U.S.), 
Touch Compass Dance Trust (New Zealand), Vertigo Dance Company (Israel), and Wheelchair 
Dance Project (Turkey). Below, we briefly describe various approaches to dance and disability 
represented or pioneered by several dance companies, in particular Candoco (U.K.), AXIS Dance 
Company (U.S.), and DanceAbility (U.S.), all contemporary companies that use a social model 
of disability to inform their work. 
AXIS Dance Company, Candoco, and DanceAbility  
AXIS Dance Company (started in 1987 in Oakland, California) was one of the first 
contemporary dance companies to help pave the way for integrated and mixed-ability dance 
worldwide. Integrated dance exists where the contributions and movement styles of all dance 
participants, those with and without physical or mental impairments, are given equal weight 
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(Benjamin, 2002). Like other integrated and mixed-ability companies and programs, AXIS 
includes contact improvisation as a method for sharing and engaging differently-abled persons’ 
experience of movement and dance. Davies (2008) describes one dancer’s experience of 
exploring contact-improvisation based techniques with AXIS and choreographers Bill T. Jones 
and Stephen Petronio. Contact improvisation was initiated by Steve Paxton in the early 1970s. In 
this heuristic method, improvising dancers are joined through ever-changing points of contact 
that enable them to move together and to share and shift weight and energy from one person to 
another (Pallant, 2006).  
[*Insert AXIS photo] 
Founded in London in 1991, Candoco (named to place focus on what differently abled 
bodies can rather than cannot do) was the first professional touring company to integrate 
differently-abled dancers in Europe employing both contact improvisation and Graham-based 
techniques (Benjamin, 2002). Adam Benjamin began Candoco with Celeste Dandeker, a former 
professional dancer with London Contemporary Dance Theatre who was injured onstage, leaving 
her with little ability to move her legs. They wanted to explore a form of dance that incorporated 
Dandeker’s new way of moving in a wheelchair (p. 4). 
Beginning with what a non-standard body can do initiates dance training, movement, and 
choreography development from the vantage point of a body who is already different from an 
Apollo or a sylph.  As noted above, this development was potentiated by early modern dancers’ 
rejection of traditional ballet standards at the beginning of the 20th century. Such an approach 
opens up the possibility that the graceful flow of a wheelchair moving seamlessly across stage or 
the staccato movement of a person with tremors due to Parkinson’s might be perceived and 
termed “beautiful” along neo-Burkean lines.  
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 [*Insert Candoco photo] 
DanceAbility International is an organization devoted to training teachers how to teach 
mixed-ability dance classes. It was founded by Alito Alessi in Eugene, Oregon in the late 1980s. 
Among other principles, DanceAbility holds that everyone should be able to dance (that dance is 
not for medically-termed “fit” or classical bodies only) and that dance has the social ability to 
breakdown prejudices (Herman & Chatfield, 2010). Here, dance education is acknowledged to 
affect not just the danceworld but non-dance life as well. 
[*Insert DanceAbility photo(s)]  
These innovators in dance and disability, among many others, instantiate a social model 
of disability through the medium and mode of dance. By doing so they are not just expressing the 
value of inclusiveness but showing through performance that beauty may be perceived in dance 
and in dancers performing with non-classical bodies, capabilities, and movement styles.  As 
Benjamin (1993) stated: 
If contemporary arts and contemporary dance in particular is to reflect contemporary 
society, it must, just as it did when black dancers first appeared on stage in this country, 
open its doors and its eyes to perceive beauty and worth where it has hitherto been unable. 
(p. 46) 
The question then becomes how the perception of the viewer might be changed so that they can 
see beauty where hitherto they could not.  
Reconsidering Beauty as Beauty-in-Experience 
 We have so far discussed the various concepts of beauty, which can be listed as: classical 
beauty; neo-classical beauty; Burkean beauty; and beauty-in-experience. What do we mean, 
precisely, by beauty-in-experience? Clearly disabled dance and persons can both create and fail 
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to create this experience (as can able-bodied dance and persons); not every experience with 
disability in dance or in life is necessarily beautiful. Beauty applies where there is a perceptual 
experience of beauty in the viewer. To expand one’s perceptual scope may require education to 
“see” differently. Beauty, as Burke might agree, is something one identifies when perceiving or 
feeling it in experience. It may be related to a sort of movement economy of the dancer’s 
particular body or the aids the dancer is moving with (such as the efficient movement of a dancer 
on wheels or using crutches or “walking” on their hands if they have no legs and feet). It also 
includes the idea that one can experience beauty through moving and dancing either as or with a 
differently-abled person (such as in a class, dance, or contact improvisation exercise).   
In a research study funded to examine dance students’ experience of learning dance in 
“dance technique” classes that she conducted with her own students at Coventry University 
Sarah Whatley (2007) sought to give voice to disabled dancers “who can so often feel silenced 
through their struggle to conform to normative representations of the dancing body” (pp. 6-7). 
This group of 15 female students from ages 18-26, including two students who are wheelchair 
users, reflected and reported upon their experiences in technique classes, both verbally and in 
writing, over a period of nine months. Whatley also conducted research on levels of participation 
by disabled dance students in University dance classes across the U.K., from which 13 students 
of nearly 200 students identified as disabled (see pp. 8-9). As a result Whatley identified five 
“viewing strategies” (a term she uses following the work of Louise Kateraga and Petra Kuppers) 
used by dance students without disabilities to view dance performed by dance students with 
disabilities (p. 18).  She found that these viewing strategies spanned a continuum of distant to 
empathic to transformative: 
1. Passive Oppressive—where the viewer takes a voyeuristic stance; 
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2. Passive Conservative—where the viewer has internalized a classical aesthetic 
perspective; 
3. Post-Passive—where the viewer looks to see how the disabled dancer transcends the 
disability; 
4. Active Witness—where the viewer allows disability to open up new ways of seeing 
and interpreting the body in dance that includes a radical shift in aesthetic stance; and 
5. Immersion—where the non-disabled viewer experiences their own “becoming” 
through engaging with the disabled dancer’s experience in a more fully immersive 
way (pp. 18-20). 
This framework shows how perceptions of disabled dance and disabled dancers’ bodies might be 
changed through an interpretive mode of viewing; the viewing strategies described in 4) and 5) 
show how the idea of beauty might be expanded on the viewer/perceiver end to include such 
dancing under beauty-in-experience.  In contrast, viewing strategy 1) suggests a way of viewing 
dance that treats the disabled person’s body as “on display” as spectacle, and 2) views the 
disabled body with a classical aesthetic perspective. Both are experienced as alienating by the 
disabled dancer who is the object of this othering gaze (see pp. 18-19). Viewing strategy 3) 
seems to be what Ann Cooper Albright (2013) refers to in her charge that disabled-inclusive 
dance companies sometimes remain within a traditional representational frame, “emphasizing the 
elements of virtuosity and technical expertise to reaffirm a classical body in spite of its 
limitations” (p. 301).  
In fairness, Albright also points out that in the ballet Gypsy, Cleveland Ballet Dancing 
Wheels extends “the aesthetic heritage of nineteenth-century Romantic ballet into several 
intriguing new directions” (p. 315), which presumably included movements that are organic to 
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wheelchair users. In addition, Albright points to contact improvisation as a promising way to 
achieve the immersive, experiential lens described in 5). Indeed, more than any other form of 
dance Albright suggests that contact improvisation differs from other methods of seeing and 
using disabled bodies because it succeeds in “pulling the audience in as witness to the ongoing 
negotiations of that [the disabled dancer’s] physical experience” (p. 315). 
Kuppers (2000) comments on how dance education might become better at training 
viewers to “see” differently. Suggestions include attending more carefully to spaces that disabled 
dancers have opened up through performance and complying with these performances’ request 
that they become more aware of themselves as spectators (see pp. 126-129). Here she cites the 
Magpie and Retina Dance Company’s 1997 performance for the London Blitz ’97 festival that 
emphasized the company members’ experiences with how they are treated as persons with 
learning disabilities (p. 126). She also cites performances by Bilderwerfer, a Viennese 
performance group that focuses on how audiences “read dance” in terms of what they believe is 
“natural” by disrupting these readings through the use of texts, music, glass screens, and other 
methods in public spaces (p. 127). This approach is one that fits with the work of Zitomer and 
Reid (2011), who found that children’s perceptions of dance and disability change after 
immersion in an integrated dance program that includes children both with and without physical 
differences. 
Beauty-in-experience includes both how beauty appears to the viewer and how it feels to 
participants in the dance. Introducing her book on disability culture and community performance 
Kuppers (2011) discusses a workshop on physically integrated dance practice led by AXIS 
Dance Company where the instruction was to “find a strange and twisted shape” (p. 1). At first 
she struggled to apply this direction. She explains, 
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On the ground around me are plenty of people who live in twisted bodies, to whom the 
twist is not strange, but a deeply familiar way of experiencing their bodies’ everyday 
frontality, location, or elevation while standing or sitting. (p. 1) 
As the workshop went on, however, she realized that the disability-inclusive format of the 
workshop gave her explicit permission to: 
…translate the instructions into my own limbs, find twists that do feel strange, 
that stretch my bodily imaginary, that lead out of the comfort zone of my personal 
dancerly base-line. The category confusion passes. (p. 31) 
Kuppers reconsidered “strange and twisted” in one of the ways that this chapter suggests that 
beauty can be reconsidered. The starting point was her own body’s “dancerly base-line” and how 
movement feels rather than just how it looks. Thus, one might feel, as well as perceive, beauty. 
This idea that beauty can be felt in both lived experience and in perception, not just in the 
viewing but in the process of “being”, “becoming”, or “dancing”, is echoed in Sara Houston’s 
(2015) article, “Feeling Lovely: An Examination of the Value of Beauty for People Dancing with 
Parkinson’s.” Carroll, a person with Parkinson’s, remarks that an inclusive ballet class sponsored 
by the English National Ballet made her “feel lovely” and “beautiful again” (pp. 27-30). After 
considering this auto-ethnographic account along with the work of Arthur Frank, Michael Bury, 
Petra Kuppers, and others on the social and felt impact of disability, Houston suggests that the 
experience of beauty may be associated in part with the feeling of bodily control that dance 
provides (pp. 33-34). Further, even though guided by balletic movements, this control is not an 
imposition from classical ballet, but the sort of control that is relative to the person’s uniquely 
abled body with Parkinson’s or any other body-movement affecting condition or biology. This is 
an experiential, or organic, sort of beauty. A non-disabled person dancing in a contact 
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improvisation exercise with Carroll might also feel beauty through Carroll’s body, carrying that 
experience and knowledge into other non-dance social realms where it can change new 
perceptions and experiences of beauty in disability. 
On Keeping Beauty 
In conclusion, we would like to keep the term “beauty” because we believe—with Danto, 
Scarry and Burke—that the experience of beauty is necessary to a full, rich, and “quality” life. It 
is no longer the case that only classical and neo-classical dancers are eligible for the designation 
of beautiful. Disability-inclusive and non-disability inclusive dance companies have been 
offering performances and workshops that demonstrate how disabled bodies can both look and 
feel beautiful. Our goal in this chapter has been to trace the cultural development of a theory of 
beauty that can account for this change or enable us to see these companies as working with 
traditional concepts of the beautiful beyond the classical and neo-classical. We suggest that one 
point of departure from the classical norm resides in Edmund Burke’s philosophy, which 
includes social awareness as part of the grounding for experiences of beauty. Disability studies 
has also expanded the meaning of “cultural perception” to include awareness of how the latter 
can be limited by factors that are more social than aesthetically necessary. We have also noted 
how dance practices such as contact improvisation and dance education have helped to change 
experiences and perceptions of dance and of dancers who are differently-abled. Finally, we have 
termed this kind of beauty, one that includes disability, as beauty-in-experience, so named to 
include the experience of beauty in both dance and non-dance life. Beauty-in-experience allows 
for a more “capacious regard,” as Elaine Scarry (1999) puts it, in aesthetic and everyday 
encounters with others (p. 48).   
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